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COMMENTS
AN INQUIRY REGARDING THE
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
LEGAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED IN
UNITED STATES v. NORIEGA
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 4, 1988 General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) and de
facto leader of Panama,' was indicted by United States grand ju-
ries in Miami and Tampa, Florida. The twelve-count Miami indict-
ment' charged that General Noriega, as a "principal,"' had vio-
lated the Travel Act,4 participated in a racketeering enterprise
(RICO),5 and conspired to import, distribute and/or manufacture
cocaine for sale in the United States.6 The three-count Tampa in-
1. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
2. United States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079CR (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988). Indicted
along with Noriega were Pablo Escobar Gaviria and Gustavo DeJesus Gaviria-Rivero, lead-
ers of the Medellin drug cartel; Major Luis del Cid, an officer in the PDF; Amet Paredes,
son of former Panamanian National Guard Commander Reuben Dario Paredes; Ricardo
Bilonick, a Panamanian civilian who was a part-owner of Panamanian cargo carrier Inair
Airlines; Brian Davidow, a cocaine distributor based in Miami; Francisco Chavez-Gil, an
intermediary; David Rodrigo Ortiz-Hermida, Roberto Steiner, Eduardo Pardo, and Daniel
Miranda, aircraft pilots; and Herman Velez, William Saldarriaga, Jaime Gomez, and Luis
Fernando Escobar-Ochoa, Colombian cocaine traffickers.
3. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) states that whoever directly or indirectly, by aiding and
abetting, commits a crime against the United States is punishable as a principal.
4. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1982) proscribes the use of interstate or foreign com-
merce, through travel or otherwise, with intent to facilitate unlawful activity and states that
such an act is punishable by a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
five years.
5. Id. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), (d) proscribe participation in, or conspiracy with regard to,
an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering.
6. Id. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1982) provides for punishment of individuals attempting or con-
spiring to commit an offense against the United States; 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1982) prohibits the
manufacture, distribution and intended importation of a controlled substance into the
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dictment 7 charged that General Noriega had conspired to import
and/or distribute marijuana for sale in the United States.8
The indictments of General Noriega are virtually without legal
precedent. Never has the United States attempted to extend its
criminal laws to acts committed by the leader of an important stra-
tegic ally with whom the United States has openly conducted rela-
tions,9 who, in return, has lent support to United States policy in
Latin America, 10 and where such allegedly criminal acts were com-
mitted outside United States territory." What makes the case even
more interesting is that prior to and following the indictments, a
number of reports have appeared in the press relating tales of Gen-
eral Noriega's alleged double-dealings and participation in illicit
drug trade over the past number of years12 - activities apparently
engaged in with the tacit approval of the United States. Thus, al-
though certain officials in the United States Government may have
had knowledge of General Noriega's allegedly questionable busi-
ness activities, those officials obviously were willing to overlook
such activities in exchange for the General's support of United
States military and intelligence programs in Central America. Such
a revelation necessarily warrants exacting scrutiny of the political
circumstances surrounding United States relations with General
Noriega, and the legal tools employed in the facilitation of the
indictments.
United States, including acts of manufacture or distribution committed outside of the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States; 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1982) proscribes the importation of
controlled substances subject to certain exceptions.
7. United States v. Noriega, No. 88-28CRT (M.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988). The indict-
ment also named Panamanian businessman Enrique Pretelt.
8. Id. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982) states that persons who attempt or conspire to commit any
offense involving controlled substances are subject to punishment by imprisonment or fine;
21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 963, supra note 6. Essentially, the Miami indictment (the more serious of
the two) alleges that General Noriega participated in an unlawful racketeering enterprise,
utilizing his official position to "facilitate the manufacture and transportation of large quan-
tities of cocaine destined for the United States and to launder narcotics proceeds." United
States v. Noriega, No. 88-0079CR (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988), at 1. The Tampa indictment
charges General Noriega with smuggling one million pounds of marijuana into the United
States between 1982 and 1984. Noriega, No. 88-28CRT (M.D. Fla. filed Feb. 4, 1988), at 1.
See Noriega Indicted by U.S. for Links to Illegal Drugs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1988, at 1, col.
2 (city ed.); Miami Jury Indicts Noriega, Miami Herald, Feb. 5, 1988, at 1A, col. 1 [herein-
after Miami Jury].
9. See infra note 121.
10. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 44-51.
11. U.S.: Noriega Sold Out Panama, Miami Herald, Feb. 6, 1988, at 20A, col. 1 [herein-
after Noriega Sold Out]. See infra note 18.
12. See, e.g., infra note 25.
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The United States Attorney under whom the indictments of
Noriega were issued, has acknowledged that General Noriega prob-
ably never will stand trial in the United States.13 Such an acknowl-
edgment, viewed in light of provisions of the Panamanian constitu-
tion,"' Panamanian statutory law,15 and an extradition treaty with
the United States prohibiting the extradition of Panamanian na-
tionals,' 6 serves as a strong basis for questioning the law enforce-
ment purpose of the grand jury proceedings and subsequent indict-
ments of General Noriega.
Noriega represents the ultimate intersection of United States
domestic law and foreign policy,' 7 and its precedential value should
not be understated. 8 The case presents interesting questions of
13. See Noriega Sold Out, supra note 11 (statements of former United States Attorney
for the Southern District of Florida Leon B. Kellner); Miami Jury, supra note 11. See also
Others Could Help Arrest Noriega, Miami Herald, Feb. 6, 1985, at 21A, col. 1 (examining
the unlikelihood of direct extradition of Noriega from Panama to the United States and the
possibility of indirect extradition from a third country should Noriega leave Panama) [here-
inafter Others Could Help].
14. PANAMA CONST. art. 24 (1983) (1986 ed.) ("The State may not extradite its nationals
• ..for political offenses.").
15. PANAMA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 2508(1); Law No. 23, art. 30(1) (governing
the extradition of persons charged with drug-related offenses) cited in United States v.
Noriega, No. 88-0079CR (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 1988) at exhibit A, p.3 (Response of United
States to Defendant's Motion to Allow Special Appearance of Counsel, declaration of Mary
Ellen Warlow, Associate Director of the United States Justice Department Criminal Divi-
sion's Office of International Affairs).
16. Treaty Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, May 25, 1904, United States-
Panama, art. 5, 34 Stat. 2851, T.S. No. 445, reprinted in 2 I. KRAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, ExTRA-
DITION LAWS & TREATIES: UNITED STATES 680.1 (1987) ("Neither of the contracting parties
shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects under the stipulations of this
Treaty.").
17. Essentially, United States foreign policy toward Panama implicitly permitted Gen-
eral Noriega to engage in illicit drug trade, see infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text,
and, therefore, was on a collision course with intensifying United States domestic policy
against the importation and use of illegal drugs. In this connection, Noriega is a product of
the foreign and domestic policy collision and is illustrative of the harmful effects that can
arise from maintaining contradictory policies.
18. Only once before, in United States v. Saunders, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 14, col. 2
(S.D. Fla. July 19, 1985), has the United States prescribed its criminal laws over a foreign
leader. See Duffy, Three Island Leaders Face Bribe Counts, Nat'l L.J., July 29, 1985, at 6,
col. 1. However, the circumstances surrounding Saunders bear little resemblance to those
involved in Noriega.
In 1985, a United States grand jury indicted several officials of the Turks and Caicos
Islands, a self-governing Caribbean protectorate of Great Britain. Norman Saunders, Chief
Minister of the Turks and Caicos Islands, and fellow Turks and Caicos officials Alden
Smith, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works, and Stafford Missick, Minister of
Commerce and Development, were charged with violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C §§
371, 1952 (a)(3) (1982), and conspiracy to import and/or distribute controlled substances for
sale in the United States, 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1982). The indictment of Saunders, Smith, and
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first impression regarding the reasonableness of the United States
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the utilization of the
federal grand jury in a case thoroughly riddled with politics. While
federal grand jury procedures provide a convenient means for the
United States to apply pressure on foreign leaders who are per-
ceived to be breaking United States law extraterritorially, such
utilization of the grand jury exposes the institution's weakness of
political manipulability and thoroughly defeats its purpose in cases
where the United States does not maintain the leverage necessary
for effective enforcement of an indictment. 9 In the instant case,
the United States government has taken advantage of its unique
position as the sole overseer of the federal grand jury process, and
in so doing has been accused - with or without justification - of
conducting foreign policy through its system of criminal proce-
dure.20 The indictments of General Noriega have placed in jeop-
Missick was issued at the conclusion of an intensive three-month United States Drug En-
forcement Adminstration (DEA) investigation, the focus of which was the dissolution of
support organizations important to the export of illicit drugs to the United States. See Chief
Minister Arrested on Drug Charges, Sunday Times (London), Mar. 7, 1985, at 6, col. 4
[hereinafter Chief Minister Arrested]. The grand jury received direct evidence supporting
the DEA's allegation that, in exchange for money, Saunders had granted aircraft landing
rights on the Turks and Caicos Islands to drug smugglers en route to Colombia. The direct
evidence consisted of video tapes of Saunders taking kickbacks from DEA agents posing as
drug smugglers between January and March 1985 in Miami. Ultimately, Saunders, Smith
and Missick were arrested while visiting the United States on business unrelated to the
crimes for which they had been indicted, see Chief Minister Arrested, and Saunders and
Missick subsequently were convicted. See Duffy, Two Turks and Caicos Leaders Convicted
on Drug Charges, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 14, col. 2. Norman Saunders was convicted on
one count of conspiracy to travel to promote a narcotics business and five counts of travel to
further that business. Id. Stafford Missick was convicted of one count of conspiracy to im-
port marijuana and cocaine into the United States, one count of conspiracy to travel to
promote that business, and two counts of actual travel in furtherance of that business. Id.
Noriega is easily distinguished from Saunders. Although certain charges contained in
the respective indictments were similar, the charges contained in the Noriega indictments
are far more extensive than those involved in Saunders. More importantly, unlike General
Noriega, who was charged with crimes in which he participated outside United States terri-
tory and has yet to be taken into custody, Norman Saunders was arrested as a result of
criminal transactions in which he participated within United States territory. See, e.g.,
Noriega Sold Out, supra note 11.
Simply put, Norman Saunders and his cohorts were the subjects of a well-planned DEA
operation reasonably calculated to bring the suspects to trial in the United States, thereby
achieving a valid law enforcement purpose. On the other hand, the effort to indict General
Noriega, while certainly the result of intensive investigation and evidence-gathering, see
Miami Jury, supra note 8, appears to have not been thoughtfully conceived.
19. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Strasser, Noriega Charges: Misuse of Courts?, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 1988, at
3, col. 1. Noriega's American attorneys have asserted that "the United States is trying to
remove General Noriega for various reasons and is conducting 'diplomacy by indictment'
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ardy the credibility of United States criminal law and procedure,
and deference to the rule of law both at home and abroad. It is
essential, therefore, that the United States rethink the legal strat-
egy employed in Noriega in preparation for similar future cases.
II. BACKGROUND: THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE CASE
A. Noriega and the Consolidation of Power
Manuel Antonio Noriega began his rise to power in the early
1970s as head of the intelligence branch (G-2) of the Guardia Na-
cional de Panama (National Guard) under the regime of General
Omar Torrijos.21 Noriega, therefore, was privy to, and had control
[and that] '[t]he purpose of [the Miami indictment] is to shape foreign policy," thereby
resulting in a misuse of the courts. Id. See also Lawyer: Noriega Indicted for Opposing U.S.
Policy, Miami Herald, Feb. 8, 1988, at 4A, col. 1 (examining the credibility of the grand jury
witnesses whose testimony contributed to the issuance of the indictments, and the slim
chance of Noriega standing trial in the United States).
21. In 1968 Torrijos commanded a successful coup d~tat resulting in the overthrow of
civilian President Arnulfo Arias Madrid. Torrijos was a respected military leader whose
strong nationalism garnered the broad support of the Panamanian military and populace.
See generally W. JORDEN, PANAMA ODYSSEY (1984). On the other hand, President Arias,
while personally well-liked by Panamanians, was involved in an unpopular government sus-
pected of mass corruption. Id.
Rather than forming a new civilian government, Torrijos remained in power. In March
1969, Torrijos declared a temporary formal moratorium on organized political activity and
the legal extinction of all political parties, pending the reformulation of the electoral code
and a restructuring of the party system. GALE RESEARCH COMPANY, COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD YEARBOOK 1987 940-49 (1987) [hereinafter GALE RESEARCH]. Thus, formal political
debate within Panama was stifled until the "temporary" moratorium was lifted in order to
allow debate on the 1977 Panama Canal Treaties, infra note 43. See generally Arias Calde-
ron, Panama: Disaster or Democracy, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 328 (Winter 1987/88).
In addition, Torrijos institutionalized military rule in Panama through constitutional
changes including a provision which granted him extraordinary executive powers. See PAN-
AMA CONST. art. 277 (1972). Indeed, contrasting certain provisions of the 1946 Panama con-
stitution with the 1972 consititution vividly illustrates the "legal" integration of military
rule into the Panamanian governmental structure after 1968.
The Panama constitution of 1946, in its description of the Panamanian State, provided
for the separation of powers among a tripartite system consisting of executive, legislative,
and judicial branches; it made no mention of the military or police. See PANAMA CONST. tit.
1, art. 2 (1946) ("The Public power emanates only from the people. The State exercises it in
the manner established by this Constitution, by means of the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial Organs, which act within limits and separately, but in harmonious collaboration.").
Rather, the purposes and functions of the military and police - known jointly as the "Fu-
erza Publica" (Public Force) - were addressed separately. See PANAMA CONST. tit. 8, arts.
248-51 (1946) (providing for the separate organization of the military and the National Po-
lice, and explicitly acknowledging both the nondeliberative nature of the Public Force and
the role of the lawmaking body of the government regarding the power to regulate the "im-
portation, manufacture and use" of certain arms).
The 1972 constitutional revisions substantially altered the structure of national govern-
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over, the exchange and transmission of military intelligence, crimi-
nal investigations, customs, and immigration.22 In such a powerful
position, Noriega became valuable to the United States in light of
that country's political-military interests in Latin America, 2  and
his services allegedly were utilized by the United States Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency
ment in Panama. First, the 1972 constitution placed the Public Force on virtually equal
footing with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches by explicitly incorporating the
Public Force into the description of the Panamanian State. See PANAMA CONST. tit. 1, art. 2
(1972) ("The Public power emanates from the people. It is exercised by the Government
through the distribution of functions among Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches,
members of which will act in harmonious collaboration among themselves and with the
Public Forces" [emphasis added]). Second, the provision for separation of powers contained
in the 1946 constitution was eliminated. Third, Title 8 of the 1946 constitution, describing
the role of the Public Force, was reformulated into new Title 13 which explicitly stated that
the "National Defense and Public Security shall be exercised by an institution called the
National Guard." Gone were the 1946 provisions regarding the separation of the military
and police and the nondeliberative nature of the Public Force; the provision regarding the
role of the lawmaking body in the regulation of the manufacture, importation and use of
certain arms was made innocuous by amendments. See PANAMA CONST. tit. 13, arts. 269-71
(1972).
Ultimately, it was a particular enactment under new Title 13, subtitled, "Transitory
Provisions," which, when read in connection with the other new constitutional provisions,
gave Torrijos extraordinary authority as head of government. For example, Torrijos was
given, for a period of six years, express authority as "Commander-in-Chief of the National
Guard [and] Maximum Leader of the Panamanian Revolution" to perform functions rang-
ing from free appointment and removal of Ministers of State to approval power regarding
the execution of contracts and the power to direct foreign relations. Moreover, Torrijos was
granted the power to participate and vote in the National Legislative Council and to partici-
pate in the debates of the National Assembly. See PANAMA CONST. tit. 13, art. 277 (1972).
In the late 1970s, pursuant to agreements made with United States President Jimmy
Carter during the negotiation of the Panama Canal Treaties, see infra note 43, General
Torrijos embarked on a phase of democratic reform in Panama as a way of guiding the
transition from military to civilian rule. While such "reform" gave the appearance that Pan-
ama was heading toward the United States form of democracy, thereby clearing the way for
United States Senate ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, the changes merely were
cosmetic, because the provisions of the 1972 Panama constitution, with the exception of
article 277, remained in force. See PANAMA CONST. tit. 13, art. 277 (1972). Thus, undemo-
cratic laws - such as the "temporary" 1969 moratorium on formal nongovernmental politi-
cal activity - finally were ended and political parties again were legal in Panama. See GAE
RESEARCH, at 944. However, General Torrijos subsequently founded the Democratic Revolu-
tionary Party (PRD), a political vehicle of the National Guard, in order to perpetuate his
rule. See Arias Calderon, at 331-32. Regardless of Torrijos' democratic reforms, the formal
role of the military in government was not about to change, and following Torrijos' death,
the top officers of the National Guard, including Noriega, Ruben Dario Paredes, and Ro-
berto Diaz Herrera, established a compromise agreement granting each a role in the com-
mand of the military and the governance of Panama. Id. at 331.
22. See Cooper, Lane, Nordland, Gonzalez, Parker & Sandza, Drugs Money & Death,
NEwSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1988, at 32 [hereinafter Cooper & Lane].
23. See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
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(DIA) of the United States Department of Defense.2 4 Interestingly,
it was as head of G-2 that Noriega was first suspected of being
involved in illicit drug trafficking." Of course, Noriega's access to
intelligence information placed him in close proximity to General
Torrijos, e and by the time of Torrijos' demise in a 1981 helicopter
crash,2" Noriega had accumulated a wealth of political influence.28
Noriega was the most logical candidate to replace General Torrijos,
and had positioned himself in anticipation of the ensuing struggle
for succession.
Noriega assumed command of the National Guard in 1983,
and three significant events followed. First, the 1972 constitution
was amended, formally eliminating the role of the military in the
government.2 ' The approved draft was essentially a resurrection of
the 1946 Constitution.30 However, by 1983, the National Guard
had acquired substantial political and economic power, and was
entrenched in the operation of the Panamanian government. These
factors, combined with the chilling effect of a 1969-77 moratorium
on formal political activity, the power of the National Guard-con-
trolled Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), a thriving canal-
based economy, United States support, and the nationalistic ideol-
ogy of "Torrijismo," permitted Noriega and the military to circum-
24. Indeed, it has been alleged that General Noriega was financially remunerated for
intelligence services he supplied beginning in the late 1960s. See Cooper & Lane, supra note
22, at 35; Arias Calderon, supra note 21, at 340. See generally infra note 57.
25. Reports indicate that the United States government suspected General Noriega's
ties to drug trafficking as far back as 1972, but that the United States believed Noriega's
position and knowledge were too valuable to be outweighed by allegations of his involve-
ment in illegal narcotics trade. See, e.g., Miami Jury, supra note 8; U.S. Suspected Noriega
Drug Ties, Miami Herald, Feb. 7, 1988, at 1A, col. 5 ("Official U.S. concern about Noriega's
activities was expressed as long ago as 1972 and was reiterated in a Defense Department
memorandum dated November 1, 1985, which noted that the Panamanian armed forces
leadership 'is involved in illegal activities (e.g., drugs)' "). See also U.S. Aides in '72
Weighed Killing Officer Who Now Leads Panama, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at 8, col. 3
(city ed.) ("Law enforcement officials in the Nixon Administration once proposed the assas-
sination of General ... Noriega, who was then chief of intelligence of the [National Guard],
as partial solution to that nation's heavy drug trafficking") [hereinafter Killing Officer];
Panama Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms and Illicit Money, N.Y. Times, June 12,
1986, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.) ("The army commander of Panama... is extremely involved in
illicit money laundering . . . drug activities, and has provided a Latin American guerilla
group with arms, according to evidence collected by American intelligence agencies") [here-
inafter Strongman].
26. See Arias Calderon, supra note 21, at 332.
27. See generally W. JORDEN, supra note 21.
28. See Arias Calderon, supra note 21, at 330-32.
29. See generally PANAMA CONST. (1983).
30. See supra note 21.
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vent the purpose of the 1983 constitutional amendments and to
continue in power, under the facade of formal democracy."
Second, in September 1983, the National Guard was formally
restructured and renamed the Panama Defense Forces (PDF),3 2 in-
corporating under a single command the armed forces (i.e., the Na-
tional Guard, Air Force, Navy, and Canal Defense Force), the Po-
lice, and the Traffic, Immigration, and Investigation
Departments.3 Notably, the PDF was assigned the responsibility
of narcotics interdiction." Thus, as commander-in-chief of the new
PDF, Noriega was in charge of a massive and pervasive military
bureaucracy with no civilian oversight.3 5
Finally, Noriega allegedly had agreed to provide support for
fellow commander Ruben Dario Paredes' presidential candidacy in
the 1984 elections.3 However, Noriega subsequently undercut the
Dario Paredes campaign by creating a coalition of pro-government
political parties known as the National Democratic Union
(UNADE), 37 which, in turn, supported former World Bank vice
president Nicolas Ardito Barletta as its presidential candidate.38
Ardito Barletta and UNADE ultimately were victorious in the 1984
elections, amidst charges of election fraud.39 However, the Ardito
Barletta presidency was short-lived. In 1985, allegedly as a re-
sponse to pressure exerted by Noriega, Ardito Barletta resigned af-
ter supporting a controversial call for an investigation into the
death of political opposition leader Hugo Spadafora. 0 In the end,
31. See generally W. JORDEN, supra note 21; GALE RESEARCH, supra note 21; Cooper &
Lane, supra note 22; Arias Calderon, supra note 21; Miami Grand Jury, supra note 8.
32. See GALE RESEARCH, supra note 21, at 949.
33. See id. A stated objective of the 1983 military restructuring was the "enhancement
of its professional capabilities in preparation for greater responsibilities in defense of the
[Panama] canal," the control of which will be transferred to Panama in the year 2000. Id.
The United States provided the new PDF with assistance pursuant to a 1984 "Force Mod-
ernization Plan" involving an increase in the number of officers, troops, and units, and the
upgrading of equipment and training for anti-terrorist and low-intensity warfare activities.
Id. See also Arias Calderon, supra note 21, at 333.
34. See GALE RESEARCH, supra note 21, at 949.
35. See Arias Calderon, supra note 21, at 333.
36. Cooper & Lane, supra note 22, at 35.
37. The UNADE coalition primarily consists of the PRD, the Labor Party (PALA), the
Republican Party, and the Liberal Party. See Arias Calderon, supra note 21, at 333.
38. Id.
39. Id. Arias Calderon alleges that the Democratic Opposition Alliance (ADO), a coali-
tion primarily composed of the Authentic Panamanian Party and the Christian Democratic
Party, "obtained a majority of some 50,000 votes [in the 1984 election] but it was unable to
mobilize the country in defense of its victory." Id. at 333.
40. Id. at 335; Cooper & Lane, supra note 22, at 35.
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it was General Noriega who became the true leader of Panama, for
although he was not an elected official, the General commanded
executive power under the new Panamanian military structure, in
combination with the entrenched military-based social structure
initiated by Torrijos in 1968.
B. United States Strategic Interests in Panama and Rela-
tions With Noriega
Since the commencement of its construction in 1897, the over-
sight, operation and the security of the Panama Canal has been
the top priority in United States-Panama relations."' Although the
canal's importance to the United States has decreased in recent
years,'4 2 the waterway remains a source of serious American politi-
cal concern, as illustrated by the continuing debate surrounding
the Panama Canal Treaties. 3 More immediately, however, United
States concern over political events in Latin America and the Car-
ibbean has made cooperation with Panama imperative.
Most importantly, Panama is the headquarters for the 10,000
troop United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which is
responsible for American military operations in Latin America.4
41. For a detailed accounting of the creation of the Panama Canal and the combination
of public and private international interests which brought the canal to fruition see D. Mc-
CULLOGH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE SEAS (1977).
42. See Rohter, The Strategic Importance of a Waterway, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988,
at 3, col. 4 (city ed.)("[O]fficials of the Panama Canal Commission, . . . acknowledg[e] that
the waterway is no longer critical to the United States and that its relative importance is
declining in world trade").
43. Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, 93 Stat. 452,
T.I.A.S. No. 10030 , reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1022 (1977); Treaty Concerning the Permanent
Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, 93
Stat. 452, T.I.A.S. No. 10029, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1040 (1977). The treaties provide for
the transfer of control of the canal from the United States to Panama in the year 2000. See
generally The Panama Canal Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-70, 93 Stat. 452 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 3601 (1982)) reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1034; Recent De-
velopments, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 283 (1980). See also W. FURLONG & M. SCRANTON, THE DY-
NAMICS OF FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREA-
TIES (1984); W. JORDEN, supra note 21; G. MOFFETT, THE LIMITS OF VICTORY. THE
RATIFICATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES (1985). Specifically, the continuing debate
involves the allocation of the authority and responsibility to defend the canal, an aspect not
clearly provided for in either of the two treaties. See, e.g., Erickson, The Panama Canal:
Potential Problems in the Years Ahead, 5 FLETCHER FORUM 119 (1981); Maier, United
States Defense Rights in the Panama Canal Treaties: The Need for Clarification of a
Studied Ambiguity, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1984); Rohter, supra note 42.




Moreover, Panama has become useful to the United States intelli-
gence community as a convenient monitoring post."5 Of course, a
military-intelligence investment of such magnitude could not be
maintained without stability in the Panamanian government and
without the help of General Noriega as Commander-in-Chief of the
PDF. According to testimony before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,
General Noriega has been instrumental in furthering United States
political interests in Latin America" such as assisting the Nicara-
guan contras.7 In exchange, Panama allegedly has been supplied
with intelligence information gathered by United States agencies,"'
and Noriega has been permitted to carry on questionable commer-
cial activities involving both legitimate Panamanian business en-
terprises 9 and illicit narcotics trafficking, without resistance from
the United States government. 0 However, it is important to note
that such allegations should be weighed against the inherent politi-
cal tensions involved in the current rift in United States-Panama-
nian relations.5 1
Even with such policy considerations in mind, the conflicting
attitudes within the United States Executive Branch regarding re-
45. See Rohter, supra note 42.
46. See United States Putting New Heat on Noriega, 46 CONG. Q. 293 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter New Heat]. See also U.S. Officials Express Concern Over Charges Against Panama-
nian, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at 8, col. 3 (city ed.) [hereinafter Officials Express
Concern].
47. Id. See also Parry, From Pretoria to the Contras?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1988, at 36;
Drug Link to Contras Claimed, Miami Herald, Feb. 12, 1988, at 10A, col. 1; Hearings Tie
Noriega to Contras and Drugs, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 11, 1988, at 3; Pentagon Official
Linked to Contra Arms Plan, Miami Herald, Feb. 8, 1988, at 1A, col. 2; Ex-Aide: Noriega
OK'd Contras' Use of Bases, Miami Herald, Feb. 11, 1988, at 1A, col. 3; Noriega Foe: North
Asked Help in Arms Plot, Miami Herald, Feb. 4, 1988, at 15A, col. 1.
48. Id. See also Noriega Got CIA Reports, Ex-Aide Says, Miami Herald, Feb. 10, 1988,
at 1A, col 5. But cf Senator Rebuts Testimony, Miami Herald, Feb. 12, 1988, at 10A, col. 2
("Senate Intelligence Committee [chairman David Boren] who is looking into U.S. relations
with Panama for the past year, says he does not believe the CIA improperly gave classified
reports on U.S. Senators to . . . General ... Noriega").
49. See U.S. General Tells of "Shady" Dealings by Noriega, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1988,
at 12, col. 1 (city ed.) (testimony of retired General Paul Gorman, commander of
SOUTHCOM from 1983 to 1985, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Sub-
committee for Western Hemisphere Affairs) [hereinafter Shady Dealings]; General: U.S.
Ignored Noriega's Role in Drugs, Miami Herald, Feb. 9, 1988, at 1A, col. I (same); Busi-
nesses Add to Noriega's Clout, Miami Herald, Feb. 6, 1988, at 1A, col. 1 (giving a detailed
account of General Noriega's and the PDF's involvement in various Panamanian
businesses).
50. See supra note 25.
51. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
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lations with General Noriega are obvious and disturbing. For in-
stance, less than one year before the Miami and Tampa indict-
ments for illegal drug trafficking were handed down, in May 1987,
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Director John C. Lawn
sent letters to General Noriega praising his efforts in illicit drug
interdiction. 2 In addition, American Embassy officials in Panama
City described the General as "extremely cooperative" in helping
the United States crack down on drug trafficking.6 3 This praise, so
close in time to the indictments and to a United States Depart-
ment of State recommendation that Panama be penalized for fail-
ing to take adequate measures to stem the flow of illicit drugs, 54 is
disconcerting, to say the least. The contradictions seem to beg the
question of whether certain officials in the United States Govern-
ment knew of General Noriega's alleged involvement in illicit drug
trafficking.
C. Origins and Frustration of United States Efforts to Oust
Noriega: Setting the Stage for Criminal Proceedings
The relatively recent turn in United States relations toward
the Noriega regime appears to have been touched off by a spring
1986 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations sub-
committee hearing regarding allegations of General Noriega's ties
to drug trafficking and to the brutal murder of political opposition
leader Hugo Spadafora.s5 Following the Senate inquiry, in June
1986, a number of news articles appeared in the New York Times
alleging that General Noriega was heavily involved in money laun-
dering, narcotics trafficking, secret dealings with Latin American
guerilla groups, and providing intelligence information to Cuba,
and that such activities had been ignored by the United States Ex-
ecutive Branch. 6 In addition, the United States House of Repre-
52. See U.S. Officials Praised Drug Effort by Noriega, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1988, at 11,
col. 1 (city ed.).
53. See Shady Dealings, supra note 49.
54. See State Department Asks Reagan to Penalize Panama Over Drug Trafficking,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1988, at 12, col. 1 (city ed.). See also Drug Unit Said to Have Ne-
glected Evidence of Noriega Trafficking, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
55. See Situation in Panama: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemi-
sphere Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
See generally Arias Calderon, supra note 21; Cooper & Lane, supra note 22.
56. See Strongman, supra note 25; Killing Officer, supra note 25; Officials Express
Concern, supra note 46 ("The Reagan Administration and its predecessors were... aware
of General Noriega's ... activities, including the simultaneous transfer of intelligence to
Cuba and the United States. Administration officials said that the United States had been
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sentatives Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted its own investi-
gation into corruption and narcotics racketeering within the
Panamanian government and the PDF 7 Although the House
hearings seemed to confirm at least some of the allegations por-
trayed in the New York Times articles, neither Congress nor the
Administration appeared willing to pursue further the matter."
It was not until one year later, in the summer of 1987, that the
United States was forced to take a firm stand against General
Noriega. In June 1987, retired PDF Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera,
a first cousin of Omar Torrijos, 9 publicly accused General Noriega
of taking part in the murder of Hugo Spadafora and the assassina-
tion of Torrijos,60 committing electoral fraud in 1984, and partici-
pating in illegal drug trafficking. 1 Diaz Herrera's remarks were fol-
lowed by a series of public demonstrations in Panama calling for
Noriega's resignation, but General Noriega rebuked the protests
and blamed the civil unrest on the United States. 2 The United
States soon joined in the call for democracy in Panama, but ap-
peared unwilling to take any solid steps toward applying overt
pressure on General Noriega. 3 However, in July, following anti-
willing to accept his activities because of the privileges granted by . . . Noriega . . . for
military and intelligence purposes"). Of course, General Noriega denied all of the accusa-
tions presented in the press. See Panamanian, Denying Charges, Says He Won't Quit, N.Y.
Times, June 18, 1986, at A3, col. 3 (city ed.) [hereinafter Won't Quit]; Panamanian Says
Charges Are Aimed at Nation, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1986, at 3, col. 4 (city ed.).
57. See Issues in United States-Panama Anti-Narcotics Control: Hearings Before the
Task Force on International Narcotics Control of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
58. In fact the only action taken by the United States was the delivery by United
States Ambassador to Panama, Arthur Davis, of a "formal clarification" of United States
policy toward Panama. See, e.g., U.S. Envoy to Panama Delivers a Note on Policy, N.Y.
Times, June 17, 1986, at A5, col. 2 (city ed.); U.S. Envoy Outlining Policy for Panama, N.Y.
Times, June 16, 1986, at As, col. 1 (city ed.).
59. See Arias Calderon, supra note 21, at 328.
60. Diaz Herrera alleged that the helicopter crash which took the life of General Tor-
rijos was the result of sabotage. See Kinzer, infra note 61.
61. Arias Calderon, supra note 21, at 329. See Kinzer, Future of Canal an Issue Again
in Panama, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.) ("[Alnti-government riots and
other protests were ignited ... by a series of accusations of military misdeeds [by General
Noriega]").
62. See, e.g., Won't Quit, supra note 56; Panamanians Promise More Protests, N.Y.
Times, July 12, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.); Panama's Government Unleashes Drive to
Blame U.S. for Trouble, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1987, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.); Panama's
Strongman Tries to Ride Out the Storm, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1987, at A2, col. 3 (city ed.).
63. The only measure taken by the United States at this juncture was a Senate Resolu-
tion calling for the restoration of democracy in Panama. S. Res. 239, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
133 CONG. REc. S8848-49 (1987). See also New Heat, supra note 46; U.S. Berates Panama-
nian Regime in Pressing for Democratic Rule, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at Al, col. 5 (city
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American demonstrations in front of the United States Embassy in
Panama City,64 the Reagan Administration suspended all military
and economic aid to Panama."5
During the remainder of the summer and into the autumn of
1987, General Noriega's resistance to political change intensified,
as did the anti-government protests within Panama and the swell-
ing tide of United States criticism of the General's regime. 6 Fi-
nally, in late December 1987, the Reagan Administration sent As-
sistant Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage to Panama in an
unsuccessful effort to convince General Noriega to abdicate his po-
sition as Commander-in-Chief and make an "honorable" exit.7
Thus, the stage was set for the indictments. The official
United States position, as enunciated by the Department of Jus-
tice, has been that the purpose of the indictments is to achieve a
valid law enforcement purpose in seeking to bring a suspected
criminal to trial without consideration of United States foreign
policy interests." While much of the public debate surrounding
Noriega has focused on whether the indictments were issued as an
improper way of furthering United States foreign policy where the
political apparatus seems to have failed,69 such an argument misses
ed.); Panama Military Holding to Power, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1987, at 11, col. 1 (city ed.).
64. See U.S. Lashes Out at Panama Regime, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1987, at 2, col. 6 (city
ed.) ("[Tihe State Department said the [Panamanian] military had orchestrated [the dem-
onstrations] to counter American calls for democratic rule").
65. See U.S Suspends Aid to Panama to Press Regime for Change, N.Y. Times, July
24, 1987, at Al, col. 2 (city ed.).
66. See In Panama, Protest is a Daily Aflair, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1987, at 3, col. 1
(city ed.) ("American Ambassador to Panama, Arthur Davis, delivered a strong protest note
to the [Panamanian] government two weeks ago when an American diplomat [David Miller]
was arrested and held for eight hours .. "); U.S. Walking on Eggshells in Panama Crisis,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1987, at 3, col. 2 (city ed.).
67. See U.S. Aide Urged Panama General to Yield Control, Diplomats Say, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 5 (city ed.). The plan was similar to those which resulted in
the removal of the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos and Haiti's Jean-Claude Duvalier. Id. See
generally Note, The Dictator Dilemma: A Comparison of United States and French Asy-
lum Procedures, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1087 (1987) (authored by Melissa A.
McAndrew).
68. Such a basis for seeking the indictments was reiterated by former Chief Assistant
United States Attorney Richard D. Gregorie in a lecture focusing on Noriega, given at the
University of Miami School of Law on March 8, 1988. See also Sciolino, Doubts on Panama,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1988, at 5, col. 5 (city ed.) ("The indictmentls] [were] motivated less by
foreign policy considerations than by the doggedness of two Florida Federal [sic] grand
juries").
69. An interesting argument can be advanced that the indictments were intended to
facilitate United States foreign policy by uniting Panamanian and world opinion against
Noriega, thus strengthening the overall bargaining position of the United States in negotiat-
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the crucial legal issue of whether, as a matter of United States and
international law, prescription of United States criminal jurisdic-
tion and the use of the federal grand jury/indictment process are
appropriate in such a blatantly political situation. Where a crimi-
nal indictment has no effective means of enforcement, the issuance
of such an indictment jeopardizes the credibility of the United
States criminal justice system.70 Indeed, measures taken by the
Reagan Administration subsequent to the indictments amount to a
tacit acknowledgement that the issuance of the Noriega indict-
ments was incorrect at least as a matter of policy, and that coordi-
nation between the relevant political and legal arms of the United
States Executive Branch (i.e., the Departments of State and Jus-
tice) is of utmost importance in such situations.71
III. THE INDICTMENTS IN CONTEXT
A. United States Jurisdiction to Prescribe its Laws with Re-
spect to General Noriega
The initial legal issue involved in Noriega is whether the
United States has jurisdiction to prescribe its laws with respect to
the Panamanian general where the crimes for which he has been
charged were committed outside of the United States. The United
States purports to have jurisdiction to prescribe under the objec-
tive territorial principle.72 Under the United States interpretation
ing the removal of the General. However, the opposing view is that the indictments have
impeded the removal of General Noriega because of the threat of extradition from a third
country if he were to leave Panama. This view was proffered early on by critics, see, e.g.,
Others Could Help, supra note 13; Ouster of Noriega in Peace Unlikely, Panamanians Say,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.), and in the months that have passed since the
indictments were issued, this view seems to have proven true. See, e.g., Strike Fades;
Noriega Aide Cries Victory, Miami Herald, April 1, 1988, at 1A, col. 5 [hereinafter Strike
Fades].
70. See U.S. Policy on Panama Questioned, Miami Herald, May 15, 1988, at 1A, col. 1.
71. See Reagan Gets Say in Indictment of Foreign Leaders, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1988,
at A7, col. 1 (city ed.) [hereinafter Reagan Gets Say]; Reagan Backs Deal to Drop Indict-
ments, Miami Herald, May 24, 1988, at 1A, col. 4; U.S. Plan Would Let Noriega Ally Re-
main in Office, Miami Herald, May 15, 1988, at 13A, col. 1; Noriega Exit Plan Assailed U.S.
Defends 'Plea Bargain', Miami Herald, May 13, 1988, at IA, col. 5 [hereinafter Exit Plan];
Offer to Drop Noriega Case Infuriates Prosecutors, Miami Herald, May 12, 1988, at 1A, col.
1.
72. See generally L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 820 (1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN]; Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 435
(Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]; Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and
the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 159 (1957).
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of this territorial principle, a state may prescribe its laws with re-
spect to a foreign national where the charged offense has, or is in-
tended to have, an effect in the territory exercising jurisdiction.7"
However, while application of the objective territorial principle has
not been uncommon in cases involving illicit narcotics conspira-
cies,74 utilization of objective territorial jurisdiction in the context
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) §
402 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] provides in pertinent part:
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in a substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substan-
tial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is di-
rected against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state
interests.
(emphasis added)
Parts (1), (2) and (3) of § 402 illustrate the territorial, nationality, and protective prin-
ciples of jurisdiction respectively.
74. The international legal doctrine regarding the assertion of criminal jurisdiction
based on objective territoriality began in Cutting's Case, which involved the arrest and im-
prisonment of a United States citizen in Mexico for the publication of a Texas newspaper
story criticizing the business dealings of a Mexican citizen. Cutting's Case stood for the
proposition that a state's courts may exercise objective territorial jurisdiction only where the
harmful "effect" of an extraterritorial crime has actually occurred within the territory of the
state asserting jurisdiction. See Moore, A Report on Extraterritoriality and the Cutting
Case 1887 U.S. FOR. REL. 757 (1887); 2 J. MooRE, INrERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 228 (1906),
The "effects" principle was subsequently extended in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280
(1911), which held that where an offense is committed abroad and harmful effects are in-
tended to and do occur in United States territory, United States courts may assert jurisdic-
tion based on the objective territorial principle. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927)
extended the effects principle even further. In Ford, the United States Supreme Court up-
held, on the basis of objective territoriality, the convictions of several British subjects who
had been onboard a British vessel 25 miles off of the San Francisco coast, for conspiracy to
violate United States liquor laws. The Court's use of objective territoriality as the jurisdic-
tional basis in Ford has been the source of controversy regarding the meaning of objective
territoriality and the effects principle because the convictions in Ford were based on con-
spiracy. Professor Christopher L. Blakesley posits that the Ford Court incorrectly inter-
preted objective territorial jurisdiction where conspiracy is an "inchoate offense" and has no
"effect" until the substantive crime which is the subject of the conspiracy has occurred. See,
e.g., Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1130 (1982) [hereinafter Blakesley I]. Accord F. MANN, STUDIES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 69-81 (1973) ("The effect occurring within the country [exercising juris-
diction] must be the fact which completes the offense"); Jennings, supra note 72, at 146, 175
("Practically unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot reasonably be founded on a terri-
torial principle") cited in W. HOLDER & G. BRENNAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
543-48 (1972). However, the Ford extension apparently has prevailed. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 73. Compare United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 156 (5th
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Cir. 1984) ([T]he jurisdictional requisites with regard to . . controlled substance conspir-
acy counts may be satisfied merely by proof of intended extraterritorial effects within the
sovereign territory of the United States) and United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana into the United
States with intent to distribute. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "[tihe
requirement of territorial effect may be satisfied by evidence that the defendants intended
their conspiracy to be consummated within the nation's borders" (emphasis in original),
even though no actual effect was realized in the United States) with Rivard v. United
States, 375 F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 1967) (Canadian nationals were convicted of conspiracy
to smuggle heroin into the United States on the basis of objective territorial jurisdiction
where "Rivard twice sent [his] co-conspirator . . . across the Canadian border [into the
United States] to deliver caches of heroin brought back from Europe.").
Notably, while the "protective principle" of extraterritorial jurisdiction also has been
utilized by the courts in drug smuggling cases, it has been applied with much less frequency
than the objective territorial principle and has yet to be asserted in conspiracy cases. The
protective principle is based on the theory that extraterritorial crimes which can be con-
strued as threatening to United States national security are subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States courts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 73, at § 402(c); Chelburg, The
Contours of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Drug Smuggling Cases, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL
STUD. 43 (1983); Note, Drug Smuggling and the Protective Principle, 39 LA. L. REV. 1189
(1979) (authored by Edward Thomas Meyer). See also United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679
F.2d 1373, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he protective principle allows nations to assert juris-
diction over foreign vessels on the high seas that threaten [national] security or governmen-
tal functions"); United States v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Drug
smuggling threatens the security and sovereignty to the United States by affecting its armed
forces, contributing to widespread crime, and circumventing federal customs laws"); United
States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (Application of the the
protective principle is possible "if the controlled substance in question is found near U.S.
territory or if the shipment is bound for the United States, or if the foreign defendants
know or intend that their illegal cargo will be distributed in this country"); United States v.
Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("The unlawful import of drugs bypasses the
federal customs laws, and thus directly challenges a governmental function. . . . Accord-
ingly, the protective principle supports assertion of jurisdiction in [such a] case"); United
States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp 631, 635 (D. P.R. 1978) (holding that a planned invasion of
United States territory by marijuana smugglers had a potentially adverse effect on security
and government functions in the enforcement of laws prohibiting the importation of con-
trolled substances). In light of the United States current emphasis on reducing the supply
and demand of illicit narcotics and current public opinion indicating that the illicit drug
trade poses the greatest threat to United States national security, see Wall St. J., October
17, 1988, at A24, col. 1, the courts may soon feel compelled to increase the application of the
protective principle to extraterritorial narcotics conspiracy cases.
Additionally, increasing international attention to the extensive criminal nature of drug
trafficking in the future may lead to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, which permits
courts to assert jurisdiction with regard to certain internationally condemned crimes. See
generally Shachor-Landau, Extraterritorial Penal Jurisdiction and Extradition, 29 INT'L &
CoMPAR. L.Q. 274, 284 (1980) (application of universal jurisdiction to narcotics cases); Secre-
tary General's Report on International Campaign Against Traffic in Drugs, 24 I.L.M. 1170
(1985); Thomas, International Campaign Against Drug Trafficking, 85 DEPT. ST. BULL. 50
(1985); Westrate, Drug Trafficking and International Terrorism, 12 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 19
(1985). Thus, although Professor Blakesley has argued that trafficking in narcotics has not
yet achieved sufficient interest to warrant recognition as a basis for the assertion of univer-
sal jurisdiction, see Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in 2 M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
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whether such an exercise is limited by the "reasonableness" stan-
dard enunciated by the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States. 5
Much has been written regarding the exercise of extraterrito-
rial criminal jurisdiction;7 s however, the law governing the exercise
of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction with respect to foreign lead-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 32 (1986) [hereinafter Blakesley II], and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
does not explicitly recognize narcotics trafficking as an international offense, the RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) has recognized the expanding class of universal offenses. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 73, at § 404, Comment a. Indeed, one might argue that the exercise of
jurisdiction in a case like Noriega would be far more reasonable and convincing if couched
in terms of universal jurisdiction and violations of international as well as domestic law.
Such an exercise of universal jurisdiction could be based on possible violations of the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 500
U.N.T.S. 1407 amended by 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118, 976 U.N.T.S. 3, which was
entered into force for the United States in 1967.
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 73, at § 403 states in pertinent part:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substan-
tial, direct, and forseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the ac-
tivity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the law or regu-
lation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activi-
ties, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Moreover, Comment d to § 402 states that "[t]his Restatement takes the position that a
state may exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, when the effect or intended
effect is substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under § 403." RESTAT-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 73, at § 402, Comment d (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Blakesley I, supra note 74; Blakesley II, supra note 74; Blakesley, A Con-
ceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crimes 1984
UTAH L. REV. 1149 (1984); Harvard Research, supra note 72.
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ers has not been substantively addressed. Thus, where the scope of
jurisdiction under international law varies with the international
legal person whose jurisdiction is in question," the legal person
with respect to whom jurisdiction is sought, and the nature of the
legal violation at issue, a serious inquiry regarding the reasonable-
ness of the United States assertion of objective territorial jurisdic-
tion with respect to General Noriega is necessary.
In terms of jurisdiction to prescribe, the Restatement lists a
number of criteria for determining reasonableness. 78 These criteria
may be balanced with each other as a way of concluding whether
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a foreign leader is
indeed reasonable in a given case. 9
It is true that the regulation of traveling, racketeering, and
conspiring in furtherance of an illicit narcotics enterprise is of "im-
portance" to the United States, 80 and that the United States has a
"justified expectation" 81 in seeking to bring suspected foreign nar-
cotics traffickers - regardless of their political status - to trial in
the United States. However, while such considerations of reasona-
bleness are certainly justified, Noriega illustrates some of the tech-
nical problems in exercising extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
over a foreign leader.
Objective territorial jurisdiction exercised where the activity
sought to be regulated was "intended to have a substantial effect"
within the regulating state,82 is constrained by the "extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substan-
"983tial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; . . .
In the instant case, the activities for which General Noriega was
indicted took place entirely outside United States territory. More-
over, the charges against General Noriega are couched in terms of
77. L. HENKIN, supra note 72, at 822.
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 73, at § 403.
79. While application of the § 403 "balancing test" has been examined with regard to
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe United States antitrust laws, securi-
ties regulations, and international trade controls, see, e.g., Note, Predictability and Comity:
Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1310 (1985),
the test has yet to be applied to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe
United States criminal laws with respect to foreign leaders.
80. This is a factor for determining the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction
under RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 73, § 403(2)(c).
81. This is another factor in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasona-
ble. Id. at § 403(2)(d).
82. Id. at § 402(1)(c).
83. Id. at § 403(2)(a).
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conspiracy. In this regard, where conspiracy is an inchoate offense
(i.e., an offense which has not yet had a material effect), the mag-
nitude of its "effect upon or in" the United States is open to
question.
Furthermore, prescription of United States criminal laws over
a foreign leader must be considered in light of the "importance of
the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic sys-
tem."" Although the United States, in United States v. Saun-
ders,8 5 prescribed its criminal laws over a foreign leader, any ques-
tions regarding possible future adverse "international" effects
which may have resulted from that case were removed by its
facts.86 However, the facts presented in Noriega call for a different
conclusion regarding the possibility of adverse effects on the inter-
national political, legal, and economic systems.
The harm to the Panamanian economy which has resulted
from sanctions imposed by the United States after the indictments
of General Noriega, 87 indicates the danger that seeking to punish a
nation's leader for alleged violations of United States criminal law
will result in the punishment of that nation's citizens, while their
leader remains virtually unscathed.88 The exercise of extraterrito-
rial criminal jurisdiction resulting in such vicarious punishment of
a foreign country's people is certainly unreasonable where the pos-
sibility of prosecuting the indicted foreign leader is tenuous.
An equally important consideration in determining the reason-
ableness of the exercise of objective territorial criminal jurisdiction
in a case such as Noriega is the possibility of retaliation by the
government of the indicted foreign leader. Such retaliation could,
in turn, lead to increased international legal, political, and eco-
nomic instability. While retaliation has not been severe in the in-
stant case, in similar future cases, there may be the potential for
serious damage from retaliation against the United States or its
allies by countries with less dependency on the United States or on
84. Id. at § 403(2)(e).
85. See supra note 18.
86. Id.
87. See S. 2134, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CoNG. REc. S1901-06 (1988) (imposing trade,
aviation, and banking sanctions on Panama). The Reagan Administration also decided to
deposit, in escrow, payments to Panama for the United States use of the Panama Canal. See
Exec. Order No. 12,635, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,134 (1988). See also Panama Crisis: U.S. Embargo
Moves Slowly 46 CONG. Q. 559 (1988); U.S. Puts Sanctions on Panama 46 CONG. Q. 634
(1988).
88. See Strikes Fade, supra note 69.
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which the United States is dependent.
8 e
There can be no doubt that the exercise of objective territorial
jurisdiction with respect to a foreign leader like General Noriega is
unreasonable and sets bad precedent regarding the possible long-
term upset of the international political, legal, and economic sys-
tem because such regulation is entirely inconsistent with the "tra-
ditions of the international system."90 An international legal incon-
sistency of the magnitude represented by the United States
attempted extraterritorial prescription of its criminal laws with re-
spect to General Noriega threatens to trivialize concepts of inter-
national legal and political cooperation, and comity of nations.9 1 In
89. Economic retaliation in the form of price-fixing and retaliatory legislation (i.e., se-
crecy statutes, "clawback" statutes, and blocking statutes) have been effectuated against the
United States in past cases where the United States has either sought to exercise civil juris-
diction extraterritorially or imposed economic restraints on international trade. See Note,
supra note 79, at 1311, 1320. Thus, it is certainly plausible that a foreign nation, politically
at odds with the United States, would engage in substantive retaliation (e.g., terrorist acts
against the United States) if the United States sought to indict its leader. See infra notes
108-10 and accompanying text. Based on the premise that the United States shares a global
interest in preserving a stable international political, legal, and economic climate, the
United States must act responsibly in furthering that interest. In other words, the United
States must refrain from actions which may upset international order and detract from the
attainment of "global justice." See generally Pogge, Liberalism and Global Justice: Hoff-
mann and Nardin on Morality in International Affairs, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 67 (1986).
While it may be true that General Noriega, by allegedly engaging in unlawful activities, has
not acted responsibly as the leader of his nation, the United States has been equally irre-
sponsible by attempting to prescribe its criminal laws in a situation where there exists no
effective method of enforcement and where much in terms of Panamanian political and eco-
nomic stability is at stake. In this connection, the events following the issuance of the in-
dictments against General Noriega have certainly added to the international perception that
the United States cannot effectively stem international drug trafficking through extraterri-
torial application its criminal law, and have led to serious economic and political strife in
Panama. See supra note 87. See also Unyielding Panamanian, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1988,
at 1, col. 4 (city ed.) ("The Panamanian economy is in ruins with banks closed, the poor
going hungry and a general strike scheduled to begin Monday); Strike in Panama Has Wide
Effect, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at 6, col. 1 (city ed.); Town is Short of Food and Pa-
tience, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1988, at 8, col. 4 (city ed.); Panama's Showcase Comes to
Grief, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1988, at 10, col. 1 (city ed.).
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 73, at § 403(2)(f).
91. "Comity is 'a nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own
laws'." United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1390 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (citing Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d
435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). See United States v. Field, 532 F.2d
404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
73, at § 403, Rep. note 2. In other words, comity is the "recognition which one state allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another." BALLENTINE'S
LAW DICTIONARY 220 (3d ed. 1969). Interestingly, Comment f to § 403 of the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) states that "the presence of substantial foreign elements will ordinarily weigh
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light of the current legal status of the Panamanian government"
and the deterioration of political relations between the United
States and Panama that has taken place over the past two years,"
it is unreasonable for the United States Department of Justice to
insist that the indictments of General Noriega be recognized in
Panama. In seeking to subject General Noriega to a criminal pro-
cess that is virtually unenforceable under the circumstances, the
United States has exhibited blatant disrespect of international or-
der by selfishly ignoring the interests of Panama, and has struck a
serious blow to the underpinnings of international law.94
The United States will probably contend that in addition to
furthering its own interests, the indictments of General Noreiga
were intended to further the Panamanian and international legal
orders by intensifying efforts aimed at illicit narcotics interdiction.
However, the events that have followed the issuance of the indict-
ments96 prove that such intentions were, at best, misconceived and,
at worst, merely a by-product of United States self interest. In the
end, the exercise of objective territorial criminal jurisdiction by the
United States against General Noriega is unreasonable because it
has drastically exacerbated the political problems faced by Pan-
ama which, ironically, the United States is in large part responsible
for fostering.9 6
Bearing in mind the pervasive and detrimental nature of illicit
drug trafficking, it is important for the United States to employ a
predictable legal policy when dealing with leaders of foreign na-
against application of criminal law." Although Comment f continues: "Legislative intent to
subject conduct outside the state's territory to its criminal law should be found only on the
basis of express statement or clear implication," and - in this connection - although the
criminal laws under which General Noriega has been charged have been successfully applied
extraterritorially in prior cases, the balance weighs in favor of the "substantial foreign ele-
ments" involved where objective territorial jurisdiction is sought with respect to a foreign
leader like General Noriega. Simply put, with respect to traditional international legal prin-
ciples, and as a way of avoiding future problems similar to those currently faced by the
United States and Panama, a situational line must be drawn regarding the extraterritorial
application of United States criminal laws.
92. See supra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
94. In terms of comity, the integrity of international law demands that a country seek-
ing to enforce its laws extraterritorially consider the effects of such enforcement on the for-
eign country in question. Such a consideration illustrates the concepts of international coop-
eration and mutual respect which are the foundation of international law. See generally L.
HENKIN, supra note 72, at xxxiii-xliii.
95. See supra note 71.
96. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
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tions who are suspected of seriously violating United States law."
Predictability reinforces the ideas of legal fairness and validity,
and furthers the concept of order with regard to the law sought to
be prescribed over the foreign leader. However, regardless of such
a policy's predictability, it will remain hollow if it is not readily
enforceable.98 Ultimately, whether such a legal policy can be effec-
tive in the context of a case like Noriega is arguable at best. Situa-
tions like the one presented in Noriega - while involving possible
violations of United States criminal law - are overtly political and
therefore emphasize the inadequate nature of any United States
legal proceeding under such circumstances. In short, international
political situations demand international political solutions.
B. United States Jurisdiction to Prescribe and the Head of
State Question
The United States exercise of objective territorial jurisdiction
with respect to General Noriega is exceptionally unreasonable be-
cause of the General's status as the de facto leader of Panama,"9
and the fact that the crimes for which he is charged are a result of
United States policy toward Panama. 100 However, the corollary is-
sue of whether General Noriega should be accorded immunity from
prosecution under United States law because he is a "head of
state," is far from resolved regardless of the current position of the
97. This concept relates to the possibility of disrespect for the attempted law enforce-
ment or retaliation by the foreign leader being subjected to United States criminal law. See
Note, supra note 79, at 1321 ("If other nations believe that American policy unfairly disad-
vantages their citizens or that it proceeds from fiat rather than principle, they are apt to
resist enforcement efforts and perhaps to retaliate with countermeasures of their own. Pre-
dictability imbues a finding of jurisdiction with a minimum degree of fairness"). In this
vein, even where possible violations of United States criminal laws are at issue, when it
appears that such criminal laws are being prescribed over a foreign leader in furtherance of
a political goal, disregard for the prescribed laws and retaliation by the foreign leader should
not be unexpected.
98. Notably, in the aftermath of the Noriega debacle, the Reagan Administration insti-
tuted a new policy designed to avoid such embarrassment in the future. Essentially, the new
policy provides for Presidential consultation before the Justice Department proceeds with
criminal proceedings against a foreign leader. See Reagan Gets Say, supra note 71.
99. A government is de facto when it has the assent or acquiescence of the people and
"is in actual control of the administrative machinery of the state [and] is performing gov-
ernmental functions." Fenwick, The Recognition of New Governments Instituted By Force,
38 AM. J. INT'L L. 448 (1944). Thus, in terms of his governmental status, there can be little
doubt that General Noriega is indeed the de facto leader of Panama. See supra notes 21-40
and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
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United States executive branch.10' United States law on head of
state immunity is unclear, and there exists no consistent interna-
tional standard.10 2
1. Suggestions of Immunity and Constitutional Deficiencies
Past practice indicates that grants of head of state immunity
are conferred by the United States Department of State through
"suggestions of immunity."' 03 Conversely, the State Department
may issue an "opinion" denying head of state immunity.10 4 Al-
though the terms "suggestion" and "opinion" seem to indicate that
they are nonbinding, opinions and suggestions are accorded sub-
stantial weight by United States courts. 0 5 Thus, ultimately, a judi-
101. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
102. Head of state immunity should not be confused with diplomatic or sovereign
(state) immunity. Diplomatic immunity in the United States is governed under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500
U.N.T.S. 95, and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Sovereign immunity in the United States is governed
under The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611, (1982)). Head of
state immunity, on the other hand, has never been institutionalized in formal United States
law - either by way of an international convention or domestic legislation - and remains
in a state of confusion. See Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity:
The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (1986).
103. Note, supra note 102, at 175.
104. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1109, 1110 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 456 (1987).
105. Id. (citing Kilroy v. Windsor (Prince of Wales), Civ. No. C-78-291 (N.D. Ohio
1978) excerpted in 1978 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 641-43 (holding Prince of Wales immune in
accordance with a State Department Suggestion of Immunity); Psinakis v. Marcos, Civ. No.
C-75-1725 (N.D. Cal. 1975) excerpted in 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INr'L L. 344-45 (holding Presi-
dent of Philippines immune under Suggestion of Immunity); Chong Boon Kim v. Kim Yong
Shik, (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1963) excerpted in 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 186-87 (1964) (holding Korean
foreign minister immune in accordance with Suggestion of Immunity)). See also Note, supra
note 102, at 175, 181.
Although it has been posited that, according to United States Supreme Court prece-
dent, "Suggestions of Immunity, submitted by the State Department, bind federal courts,"
Comment, The Power of United States Courts to Deny Former Heads of State Immunity
from Jurisdiction, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 355 (1988) (citing Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30,
36 (1945) and Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1943)) such a broad conten-
tion is incorrect and misleading. Simply put, Mexico and Peru merely support the proposi-
tion that "[U.S.] national interest will be better served [where] the wrongs to suitors, involv-
ing [U.S.] relations with a friendly foreign power, are righted through diplomatic
negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial proceedings." Peru, 318 U.S. at 589
(emphasis added). See Mexico, 324 U.S. at 34 ("Chief Justice [John] Marshall introduced
the practice ... that ... jurisdiction in rem acquired by the judicial seizure of [a] vessel of
a friendly foreign government, will be surrendered on recognition, allowance and certifica-
tion of the asserted immunity by the political branch of government charged with the con-
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cial determination resting on a State Department head of state im-
munity determination is vulnerable to an attack that the granting
of such immunity is a matter of executive fiat. This raises a partic-
ularly grave problem where the United States seeks to subject a
politically controversial foreign leader to United States criminal
laws.
Where foreign nationals are entitled to the same constitutional
due process of law considerations as United States citizens,106 and
where the United States seeks to subject a foreign leader to United
States criminal laws, serious questions arise regarding the constitu-
tionality of a judicial decision resting on a suggestion or opinion
issued under current State Department procedures. First, a State
Department decision to issue a suggestion or an opinion is not
made pursuant to a set standard.10 7 Second, State Department
head of state immunity decisions are not made through adminis-
trative adjudication. Rather such decisions are made at the discre-
tion of the Office of the Legal Advisor, and therefore are suscepti-
ble to political influence.10 8
For example, suppose a United States grand jury sitting in the
Southern District of Florida indicted Libyan Colonel Muammar
Qaddafi for violating United States criminal laws; in response, Lib-
yan nationalists took a number of people hostage who are either
United States citizens or citizens of an important United States
ally. Under such circumstances, in an attempt to defuse tensions
between Libya and the United States and to gain the release of the
hostages, it is likely that the State Department would issue a sug-
gestion of immunity for Colonel Qaddafi, effectively putting an end
to United States criminal proceedings against him.
duct of foreign affairs when its certificate to that effect is presented to the court by the
Attorney General." (emphasis added)). Therefore, one can conclude only that suggestions of
immunity issued by the State Department, in cases involving friendly foreign governments,
shall be given binding effect by the court attempting to exercise jurisdiction as a method of
preventing potential embarrassment which might result from a judgment against either the
United States or the foreign government. However, one cannot assume, a fortiori, that sug-
gestions of immunity (or opinions denying immunity) are binding upon a federal court at-
tempting to exercise jurisdiction in a criminal case involving the de facto head of state of an
unfriendly foreign government.
106. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution states in pertinent part that "[nlo person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. See Note, supra note 102, at 183.
108. Id. at 184-85 (citing Leigh, New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 69
PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 187, 190-91 (1975)).
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However, because there is little political leverage available to
General Noriega which would persuade the United States to grant
him head of state immunity, the State Department will probably
not grant such immunity; thus, the General will remain eligible for
prosecution in the United States. Hence, where the United States
seeks to subject a foreign leader to United States criminal laws, a
State Department head of state immunity decision based on the
magnitude of the political leverage possessed by the foreign leader
in question deprives the concept of due process of all meaning.109
Moreover, other foreign leaders who perceive themselves to be
in the same position as Colonel Qaddafi may, under similar cir-
cumstances, expect equal treatment from the State Department1
and may, therefore, feel free to disregard United States laws. Such
a result would be disastrous for both the United States and the
international community. In short, for the sake of preserving due
process of law and the international legal order, State Department
procedures regarding the determination of head of state immunity
must be perfected.
The United States Constitution distributes between the execu-
tive and legislative branches the power to conduct foreign af-
fairs.' The United States might, therefore, contend in the instant
case that a failure by the district court to follow a State Depart-
ment determination denying General Noriega head of state immu-
nity constitutes a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
In other words, the United States might argue that an independent
judicial determination regarding the head of state issue constitutes
a usurpation of the executive's foreign affairs power. However,
such an argument would almost certainly destroy the United
109. In the case of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 209 (1952), Justice Frankfurter
stated:
[although the] faculties of the Due Process Clause may be indefinite and vague,
• . . the mode of their ascertainment is not self-willed. In each case "due process
of law" requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the
spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the
detached consideration of conflicting claims, . . on a judgement not ad hoc and
episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of
change in a progressive society.
Where the United States is an interested party - as opposed to a mere intervenor, see
supra note 105 - such as in the instant criminal case, a judicial decision emanating from a
purely discretionary State Department head of state immunity decision certainly cannot be
characterized as a "disinterested inquiry." Ultimately, any such judicial decision in the in-
stant case must be regarded as "ad hoc and episodic" and ignorant of continuity.
110. See Note, supra note 102, at 186.
111. U.S. CoasT. arts. I & I.
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States claim that the case against General Noriega is legal and not
political.'12
As an interested party to a lawsuit, the United States is not
exempt from the requirements of constitutional due process. More
specifically, where the United States has taken the position that
the case against General Noriega is strictly legal, where current
State Department head of state immunity procedures will lead to a
constitutionally infirm judicial result, and where no legislative
standard for determining head of state immunity currently ex-
ists,1 ' the Noriega court is free to set the standard on which a
judicial determination of head of state immunity with respect to
General Noriega should be based, even though the Noriega case
may touch on foreign policy."'
2. United States Recognition/Diplomatic Relations Policy and
the Scope of Head of State Immunity
Head of state immunity has been most recently addressed in
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe No. 700115 where former Presi-
dent of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, moved to quash sub-
poenas requiring his testimony in front of a grand jury investigat-
ing possible corruption in American companies' arms contracts
with the Philippines. Marcos claimed that he was entitled to head
of state immunity and that he was, therefore, not required to tes-
tify." While the facts in Doe differ significantly from those in the
instant case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning gives,
at least, a slight indication of how the Noriega court might handle
such a claim.
112. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
113. A congressionally-mandated standard, codified in legislation, is certainly prefera-
ble as a method of guiding judicial decisions regarding head of state immunity. See gener-
ally Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DuKE L.J. 747 (discussing the problems involved
with judicial lawmaking as a substitute for congressional legislation). However, where there
exists no congressionally-mandated standard or binding precedent, the court must be per-
mitted to make its own inquiry.
114. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In other words, where a criminal suit is brought
by the United States against a foreign leader, suggestions and opinions issued by the Office
of the Legal Advisor under current State Department procedures amount to no more than
affidavits submitted by an interested party and should be accorded judicial deference only
to the same extent as any similar act engaged in by an interested party in a typical criminal
case.
115. 817 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 456 (1987).
116. Id. at 1109-10.
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The Doe court began its head of state immunity analysis by
stating that "the doctrine maintains that a head of state is immune
from the jurisdiction of a foreign state's courts, at least as to au-
thorized official acts taken while the ruler is in power. ' 117 Curi-
ously, the court's use of the term "at least" indicates that there
may exist other occasions where head of state immunity might be
facilitated. Indeed, the Doe court readily acknowledged that "[t]he
exact contours of head of state immunity. . . are unsettled."11 Ul-
timately, the Fourth Circuit denied Marcos' head of state immu-
nity claim on the basis that the successor government in the Phil-
ippines had "waived" such immunity for Marcos, and that to grant
Marcos head of state immunity in the face of such a waiver "would
offend the present Philippine government. '"119
In response to a claim by General Noriega that he is entitled
to head of state immunity, the United States might argue that be-
cause the United States Government formally recognizes President
Eric Arturo Delvalle as the legitimate leader of Panama, 120 General
Noriega is precluded from claiming head of state immunity. How-
ever, such an argument is logically inconsistent because of the his-
tory of United States recognition policy generally, and the nature
of United States recognition toward, and relations with, Panama
specifically. 21 In essence, the United States would be forced to
117. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1111. The court reasoned that "[hlead of state immunity is founded on the
need for comity among nations and respect for the sovereignty of other nations; it should
apply only when it serves those goals."
120. See S.J. Res. 267, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S1621-23 (1988); H. Res.
399, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H796-801 (1988); DEPT. ST. BULL. 69-73 (May
1988).
121. Since the 1960s the United States has deemphasized the use of formal recognition
with regard to regimes which obtain power through extraconstitutional means, and instead
has emphasized "diplomatic relations." This change in foreign policy doctrine is a result of
the view that "recognition," in the formal sense, is an unsuitable instrument for conducting
a realistic foreign policy and is politically manipulative. See generally L. GALLOWAY, RECOG-
NIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (1978); Dozier, Recog-
nition in Contemporary Inter-American Relations, 8 J. INTER-AM. STUD. 320 (1966). United
States policy toward Panama therefore has followed the diplomatic relations scheme.
Interestingly, prior to the indictments of General Noriega, the United States apparently
had never thought of "recognition" of the Panamanian government as a real issue, although
the United States was fully aware of the political situation in Panama. See supra notes 29-
67 and accompanying text. After the 1968 coup, the United States resumed diplomatic rela-
tions with the new Torrijos regime, see U.S. Resumes Diplomatic Relations with Panama,
DEPT. ST. BULL. 573 (Dec. 2, 1968) (official statement of Nov. 13, 1968), and despite the
State Department's November 13, 1968 official statement, which seemed to indicate that the
resumption of diplomatic relations was conditional on the "intention of the Panamanian
1989]
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take the position that General Noriega's head of state immunity
has been waived. Logically, such a position constitutes an admit-
tance that prior to the United States formal recognition of
Delvalle, the General could have claimed head of state immunity.
This reasoning poses a serious problem for the United States, be-
cause unlike Ferdinand Marcos in Doe, General Noriega is still in
power in Panama. In this connection, even though the United
States officially recognizes President Delvalle as the legitimate
leader of Panama, such recognition is hollow where President
Delvalle currently exercises no governmental power in Panama.122
Simply put, General Noriega is the de facto leader of Pan-
ama,123 and as such has been - since 1983 - at the helm of a
government with which the United States has openly conducted
diplomatic relations. Thus, it would appear that General Noriega is
entitled to head of state immunity because, under the analysis ap-
plied in Doe with respect to Marcos, the United States position
regarding official recognition is essentially without merit.1
24
Another potential contention of the United States might be
that where the violations of law for which General Noriega is under
indictment were not "authorized official acts," General Noriega is
disqualified from claiming head of state immunity. 25 However, the
Government to hold elections, to return to constitutional government, to respect human
rights, and to observe Panama's international obligations," id.,.the Johnson Administration
and its successors appeared content with maintaining hospitable relations with General Tor-
rijos as the legitimate, yet unelected, leader of Panama. See, e.g., supra note 21 and accom-
panying text. After Torrijos' death and Noriega's subsequent accession to power, the United
States continued to maintain full diplomatic relations with Panama. Moreover, the United
States did not indicate displeasure with General Noriega until 1987, see supra notes 55-71,
and did not "de-recognize" Noriega's de facto government until the indictments of the Gen-
eral were issued in February 1988. Notably, even after the recognition of Eric Arturo
Delvalle as the legitimate leader of Panama, the United States did not significantly reduce
the scope of its diplomatic relations with General Noriega's Panama until the autumn of
1988. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1988, at A5, col. 1 (city ed.).
122. Indeed, when President Delvalle expressed resistance to General Noriega's rule the
Panamanian National Assembly, responding to pressure from General Noriega, ousted
Delvalle from the government and forced him to retreat into hiding. See Noriega Prevails as
Assembly Picks New President, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1988, at 1, col. 6 (city ed.).
123. See supra note 99.
124. It is indeed ironic that the United States has returned to the abandoned policy of
"recognition" as a way of solidifying its stance against General Noriega, especially where,
following the issuance of the indictments of General Noriega, the United States has main-
tained diplomatic relations with Panama. Such a manipulation of policy is illustrative of the
inconsistent position of the United States in the instant case and detracts from the legal
and political coherence required for the proliferation of international order. See generally L.
HENKIN, supra note 72.
125. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1109, 1110 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
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Doe court, in recognizing the Philippine government's waiver of
head of state immunity for Marcos, stated that "[w]e. . .need not
decide whether .. . immunity would have extended to unautho-
rized acts during Mr. Marcos' term or whether it would have been
limited to authorized acts."' " Indeed, the Doe court refused to de-
fer to an opinion - included in the record - submitted by the
State Department's Deputy Legal Advisor indicating that neither
Ferdinand Marcos nor his wife should be accorded head of stateimmunity.12 7 Thus, at least under Doe, the acts for which General
Noriega is under indictment are not prima facie evidence that he
is precluded from claiming head of state immunity.
In addition, the General hypothetically might argue that if he
engaged in certain activities which might be construed as violative
of United States law while serving as the leader of Panama, he did
so with the acquiescence of the United States government. The es-
sence of such a contention would be that any allegedly criminal act
engaged in by General Noriega had been permitted by a United
States foreign policy which implicitly "authorized" him to do so.
Thus, one can logically conclude that during General Noriega's ser-
vice as Panama's de facto leader, his involvement in activities that
are possibly violative of United States law were a by-product of the
conduct of United States foreign policy, and that the United
States, therefore, should be estopped from initiating a prosecution
against General Noriega.
In light of the foregoing analysis, a failure by the court to
grant General Noriega head of state immunity will spell disaster
for the credibility of United States foreign relations, the applica-
tion of United States criminal laws to foreign leaders, and United
States support for international legal order. Current State Depart-
ment procedures for determining such immunity do not provide
constitutional safeguards, and the United States has maintained
full diplomatic relations with Panama under the General's de facto
control. In short, the history of United States relations with Gen-
eral Noriega's Panama seems to indicate that the United States
exercise of objective territorial jurisdiction to prescribe its criminal
laws with respect to General Noriega is patently unreasonable.
nied, 108 S. Ct. 456 (1987).
126. Id. at 1111.
127. Id. ("[I]t [is not] necessary for us to decide whether to defer to the opinion of the
Deputy Legal Advisor of the State Department, expressed in a letter that is part of the
record, that the Marcos' are not entitled to head of state immunity").
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United States government officials, civilian and military alike,
have acknowledged General Noriega's political power.12' The fact
that United States government officials may have turned a blind
eye toward the General's alleged wrongdoings in exchange for his
strategic aid certainly weighs heavily in favor of granting head of
state immunity to General Noriega. 12 The immediate issue is not
General Noriega's guilt or innocence, but the proper use by the
United States of its criminal justice system against a foreign leader
accused of violating United States criminal laws, where the case is
essentially the result of United States foreign policy decisions gone
awry. Affording General Noriega immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion certainly is not an acknowledgment of his innocence; it simply
will prevent the United States from trivializing its criminal justice
system and reducing into mere words its support for a coherent
international legal system.
C. The Federal Grand Jury Exposed
1. The Political Nature of the Institution
United States grand jury procedure130 provides a convenient
avenue for the United States government to try to place pressure
on foreign leaders whose acts may be construed as violative of fed-
eral law. First, the grand jury is not bound by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. ' Thus, the issuance of an indictment may be based in
128. See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
129. Interestingly, the United States Department of Justice allegedly considered initiat-
ing indictment proceedings against General Noriega in 1980, because of evidence tying
Noriega - then head of G-2 - to the illegal export of military hardware; the State Depart-
ment did not want the case to go forward for fear of upsetting General Torrijos. It seems
that the United States needed the cooperation of General Torrijos in providing a Panama-
nian refuge for the deposed Shah of Iran and that indicting one of Torrijos' top military
men (i.e., Noriega) would place the United States in a difficult negotiating position. See
Noriega Case Stifled in '80 Sources Say, Miami Herald, Mar. 20, 1988, at 1A, col. 5. How-
ever, even after Torrijos' death in 1981 and Noriega's subsequent accession to power in
1983, the United States continued to maintain full diplomatic relations with Panama, and
did not immediately re-institute legal proceedings against General Noriega, even though the
General's illicit business activities allegedly were well-known within the United States gov-
ernment. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
131. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND
CONCEPTS § 19.06 (1980). There are a number of reasons for not restricting the grand jury's
inquiry on the basis of the Federal Rules. First, the role of the grand jury is investigatory
and non-adjudicatory in nature, and inadmissible evidence is not without probative value.
Second, rules such as those governing hearsay are designed to be invoked during adversary
proceedings. Third, the accused's rights are protected at trial by exclusionary rules. Finally,
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whole or in part on hearsay. "' Second, the presentation of ille-
gally-obtained evidence to the grand jury is not a ground for
quashing an indictment based on such evidence. 33 Third, func-
tional oversight of the grand jury is solely in the hands of the
United States Attorney. 34 Finally, the accused has no right to ap-
pear before the grand jury." 6 Thus, it can be seen that the one-
sided nature of federal grand jury procedure is highly vulnerable to
political manipulation by the United States government. " 6 While
it is true that in typical criminal cases prosecutors maintain the
burden of preparing for trial, therefore reducing any incentive for
promoting evidentially unsound indictments, " 7 this safeguard has
no bearing in cases like Noriega. In the instant case, there is virtu-
ally no chance that General Noriega will stand trial in the United
States. 3 8 In addition, the potentially damaging revelations regard-
ing United States relations with General Noriega and United
States policy in Latin America, which may result from a federal
court trial,' 39 certainly seem to dictate against sincere legal pursuit
of General Noriega by the United States. Hence, utilization of the
federal grand jury in the context of a case like Noriega is improper
because of the possibility of unchecked abuse of prosecutorial dis-
cretion in conducting the investigation. The mere existence of such
a possibility reduces the credibility of the grand jury as a viable
institution in United States criminal procedure and defeats the
making rules of evidence applicable to the grand jury - a body comprised of laypeople -
would unduly burden the expedition of an indictment decision by subjecting grand jury
deliberations to court review. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. FED. R. CriM. P. 6(d). Although the court maintains the duty of summoning the
grand jury, alerting grand jury members as to the extent of their investigatory power and
instructing the grand jury on points of law, the court plays no part during the actual grand
jury inquiry. See C. WHrrEBEAD, supra note 148, at § 19.04.
135. C. Whitebread, supra note 131 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)). Cf.
Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 AM. CriM. L. REv. 807 (1972) (argu-
ing that an accused should have the right to participate during the grand jury's determina-
tion of probable cause and should be entitled to assistance of counsel).
136. Governmental abuse of the grand jury process and the characterization of the in-
dictment as a "rubber-stamp" of the charges sought by the prosecutor certainly are not new.
For earlier discussions of this phenomenon see, e.g., L.CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE &
ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER (1975); FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITU-
TION ON TRIMAL (1977); Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE Sc. 214 (1955).
137. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
GRAND JURY REFORM: A REvIEw OF KEY ISSUES 22 (1983).
138. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 41-54.
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rule of law.
2. The Noriega Plea Bargain
Even assuming, arguendo, that the indictments against Gen-
eral Noriega are sound in terms of the evidence on which they are
based and the motives of the prosecution, utilization of the federal
grand jury in the context of Noreiga is improper. There has been
much debate regarding the actual effectiveness of the grand jury
and whether the original purposes of the grand jury -to provide
an independent body of citizens serving the interests of the com-
munity by precluding unjust prosecutions and uncovering crime 140
- have been substantially compromised in the United States."'
However, regardless of the current state of grand jury procedure,
at least in spirit, the purposes of the institution have remained im-
portant enough to prevent its abolition at the federal level. 142 In
this connection, the grand jury indictment process has been useful
to federal prosecutors in securing profitable plea bargains.14 In-
deed, one might maintain that the efficacy of plea bargaining is a
primary reason for retention of the federal grand jury/indictment
process. In the present case, the United States attempted to strike
140. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.2 (1985); Orfield, The Federal
Grand Jury 22 F.R.D. 343 (1959) ("[The purposes of the grand jury] are to protect the
defendant and to permit the grand jury, as public spirited citizens, chosen by democratic
procedures to attack corrupt conditions").
141. The American jurisprudential theory of the grand jury as a protector of the citizen
against the will of the government evolved during the period immediately preceding the
American Revolution when the British Crown sought to prosecute colonists engaging in
anti-British civil disobedience. NATIONAL INSTrruTE OF JUSTIcE, supra note 137, at 10. How-
ever, research performed during the first half of this century indicated that grand juries
"did not actively seek out evidence of criminal offenses but rather yielded to the direction
established by the prosecutor." Id. (citing Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10
ORE. L. REV. 101 (1931)). It is interesting to note that England, which provided the model
for the United States grand jury system, abolished the grand jury requirement in 1933 be-
cause of its ineffectiveness. Id.
142. Indeed, formal abolition of the federal grand jury would require revision of the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person
shall be held to answer for a. . . crime unless on a presentment or indictment by a Grand
Jury .... " (emphasis added)).
143. A plea bargain is a negotiation between the prosecutor and defense counsel or the
accused. The plea bargain takes place after the indictment has been issued and the arrest
made, and "involves discussions looking toward an agreement under which the accused will
enter a plea of guilty in exchange for a reduced charge or a favorable sentence recommenda-
tion by the prosecutor." F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTIcE SYSTEM 495 (1980).
Alternatively, a plea bargain may involve dismissal, by the prosecutor, of some or all of the
charges contained in an indictment in exchange for difficult-to-obtain information (usually
regarding an ongoing criminal investigation) from the accused.
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a bargain with General Noriega: in exchange for a dismissal of the
charges, the General would be required to leave Panama and not
return until after the May 1989 elections.144
The formula for any successful negotiation includes the main-
tenance of some leverage by each party over the other. In the ab-
sence of such leverage on one side, the other side will have no in-
centive to bargain because nothing will be gained. With the
exceptions of direct military intervention and covert paramilitary
activity, actions which apparently have been ruled out for the time
being, the only way for the United States to gain leverage over
General Noriega is through strong Panamanian political/military
opposition. However, even though the United States - by issuing
the indictments - has clearly signaled its support for such opposi-
tion, Panamanian political leaders have failed to mobilize an effec-
tive campaign against General Noriega. Moreover, in March 1988
an attempted coup d'6tat, emanating from within the PDF, failed
and enabled General Noriega to further consolidate his power by
expelling five senior military officials.14 5
Thus, Noriega illustrates the plea bargain turned on its head.
Instead of the prosecution maintaining the leverage necessary to
force the defense to approach the bargaining table, in the instant
case it is the defense which is forcing the prosecution to bargain. In
essence, until the United States is able to offer to General Noriega
a "deal" that is of greater value to him than his current situation,
or until the United States obtains some bargaining leverage, the
General will probably remain where he is. The embarrassment suf-
fered by the United States because of this uncomfortable situation
could have been avoided if the efforts of the Departments of State
and Justice had been coordinated. Such coordination would have
enabled the Reagan Administration to see the untenable nature of
legal proceedings against General Noriega, and would have permit-
ted a viable political alternative to be formulated. 4
3. Extradition
Simply put, extradition of General Noriega to the United
144. See Exit Plan, supra note 71.
145. Panama Recasts Military, Imposes Curbs After Revolt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,
1988, at 3, col. 4 (city ed.).
146. See Strasser & Carter, In Plea Bargains, Leverage is all; Was the Noriega Deal
Proper?, Nat'l L.J., June 13, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
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States is virtually impossible. The General may not be extradited
under the United States-Panama Extradition Treaty of 1904,47 or
under Panamanian statutory or constitutional law148 because of his
status as a Panamanian national1 49 and, more to the point, because
of his position as de facto leader of Panama.1 50
Where direct economic and political intervention have failed
to force General Noriega from power and provide the United
States with an opportunity for extradition from a third country,
1 51
the only remaining method of bringing the General to the United
States to stand trial - other than by overt or covert military force
- is to forcefully abduct him under the Ker-Frisbie, Doctrine. Ac-
cording to Ker-Frisbie, an indicted foreign national may lawfully
stand trial in the United States even though he has been forced to
appear against his will. 5 '
However, application of Ker-Frisbie in the context of the in-
stant case raises questions of propriety. In cases like Noriega,
where the target for Ker-Frisbie abduction is a controversial for-
147. Supra note 16.
148. Supra notes 14-15.
149. Even if General Noriega was extraditable as a Panamanian national, difficult is-
sues normally the subject of extradition proceedings - such as the requirement of "double
criminality" (i.e., the prerequisite that the crimes for which the foreign accused is charged
are prosecutable in the country of origin) - remain unresolved. For a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the problems involved with international extradition in cases involving illicit drug
trafficking see Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman, International Extradition in Drug Cases, 10
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 353 (1985). See also RESTATEMENT (TreRD), supra note 73, at
§ 478.
150. See supra note 99.
151. See supra notes 67, 71, 87.
152. The doctrine has evolved from two cases: Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (hold-
ing that a United States citizen who is facing charges in the United States, and who is in a
foreign country, may be forcefully removed from the foreign country by United States offi-
cials and may not challenge his indictment on the ground that he was brought within
United States jurisdiction against his will) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (hold-
ing that the conviction of an accused who, as a result of forceful abduction, was brought to
trial against his will is not unconstitutional). Although Ker involved the forceful abduction
of a United States citizen in a foreign land, and Frisbie involved interstate - as opposed to
international -forceful abduction, the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine has been codified in The Re-
statement. RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 73, § 433 states in pertinent part:
External Measures in Aid of Enforcement of Criminal Law: Law of the United
States
(2) A person apprehended in a foreign state, whether by foreign or by
United States officials, and delivered to the United States, may be prosecuted in
the United States unless his apprehension or delivery was carried out in such
reprehensible manner as to shock the conscience of civilized society ....
RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 73, at § 433(3). See also id. at Comment b to § 433 and
Rep. Note 3 to § 433 (both discussing the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine).
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eign leader, the resemblance between "legal" abduction and unlaw-
ful forceful intervention in the political affairs of a sovereign is
striking. " More poignantly, in light of the history of United
States relations with General Noriega and his predecessor Torrijos,
the United States could suffer substantial public opinion backlash
and a reduction in its foreign relations credibility - not to men-
tion serious foreign policy and national security damage - from a
trial of the General.'" Such reasoning seems sufficient to justify
the conclusion that the United States government simply may not
want General Noriega to stand trial in the United States. As a co-
rollary, the United States may refuse to employ the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine in the instant case, thereby emasculating the indictments
and undermining the decisions of the Miami and Tampa grand
juries.
In summary, the legal action instituted by the United States
government in the present case has detracted from the credibility
of the federal grand jury. Moreover, the United States inability to
prosecute General Noriega might be observed by other foreign
leaders engaged in possibly criminal activities as a sign that any
criminal legal action initiated by the United States against a for-
eign leader is meaningless. " Only adverse consequences can result
from a foreign leader's disregard for the domestic law of a sover-
eign. However, disregard for a sovereign's law by a foreigner seems
unavoidable where the sovereign itself misuses its legal institu-
tions, as the United States has done with the grand jury in the
instant case.156
IV. CONCLUSION
Where the crimes for which General Noriega has been indicted
153. Such direct intervention is generally regarded as unlawful under customary inter-
national law. See L. HENKIN, supra note 72, at 689-702. Of course, if the United States
decides to forcibly abduct General Noriega, such an abduction might be justifiable if the
United States contends that the "intervention" was by the invitation of the "recognized"
government of deposed President Eric Delvalle. In support of such an argument, the United
States could contend that where President Delvalle is the constitutional leader of Panama,
he has the authority to make such an invitation. However, in light of the inconsistencies
involved with United States "recognition" of Panama, see supra notes 121, 124, the persua-
siveness of such a contention is, at best, unclear.
154. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 70.
156. See id. (comments of Harvard Law School Professor Alan Dershowitz, former
United States National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Princeton University Professor
Ethan Nadelmann, and American Enterprise Institute Fellow Mark Falcoff).
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are a by-product of United States foreign policy, prescription of
United States criminal jurisdiction with respect to the General is
unreasonable. Moreover, where the United States has openly con-
ducted relations with General Noriega's Panama, United States
recognition of Eric Arturo Delvalle as the legitimate leader of Pan-
ama and denial of General Noriega's status as a head of state are
meritless. Finally, the United States, in seeking to oust General
Noriega, has abused its position as the sole overseer of the federal
grand jury system, thereby exposing the institution's vulnerability
to political manipulation and placing in jeopardy the credibility of
the United States criminal justice system and deference to the rule
of law both at home and abroad.
Regardless of whether the indictments of General Noriega are
ultimately dismissed, subjecting the General to criminal process in
the United States is inappropriate as a matter of international and
domestic law, and sets poor precedent for future similar cases. The
United States apparently has ignored the possible international
destabilizing effects of its extraterritorial prescription of criminal
jurisdiction with respect to a politically controversial foreign
leader. Furthermore, by failing to coordinate the legal and foreign
policy branches of government, thereby permitting the issuance of
unenforceable indictments against the de facto leader of a strategi-
cally important country, and by failing to implement a foreign pol-
icy in step with domestic policy, the United States needlessly has
subjected itself to the ridicule of General Noriega, the interna-
tional community, and the American people. Hopefully, the
Noriega debacle has taught the United States that the unchecked
use of its legal process against a foreign leader may only exacerbate
the harm caused by its own flawed foreign policy and that such
harm can only be healed through international political redress.
MARK ANDREW SHERMAN*
* This article is dedicated to the author's father, Saul N. Sherman.
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